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This is the report of a hearing on 13 April 2016 at the LSE. Participants were invited 
for their expertise in relation to the governments of Scotland, Wales and English local 
authorities. In all cases, they were asked to provide neutral and objective views, rather 
than any they held personally.
We are grateful for the friendly and constructive discussions that took place on the 
subjects raised. Some participants wished not to have their views cited, so the entire event 
was treated as being held under the ‘Chatham House Rule’. Accordingly, contributions  
by individuals have not been attributed nor should any be assumed. The purpose of  
the hearing was to uncover the key issues likely to be salient to devolved and other  
sub-national units of government, whether or not the United Kingdom remains in or 
leaves the European Union.
   Foreword
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1. Introduction
The EU referendum debate is, understandably, much concerned with the UK’s existing 
and potential future international relations. Trade, the economy and diplomacy could be 
affected by a decision to leave the EU. Equally, if the UK votes to stay, there are likely to 
be implications for the country’s future external links. But the outcome of the referendum 
will also have domestic effects on the UK’s nations, city-regions and local authorities. 
It is impossible to predict with certainty what would happen to the governance of the 
UK if the country left the EU. Nonetheless, there will certainly be implications for the 
relationship between the Scottish government and Westminster, and possibly implications 
for the path of devolution within England. The UK is a remarkably centralised country. 
A vote to leave the EU might trigger a longer-term change to the constitutional 
arrangements of the UK, or might further centralise power. But it is certain that the EU 
referendum will affect internal UK government and politics just as much as the country’s 
relationship with the rest of Europe and the world.
2.   Summary
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Scotland
Scotland’s position within the UK means 
that it is able to have a voice within the 
European Commission and the other 
institutions of the EU. Scotland supports 
the UK position where it suits Scotland, but 
it also enjoys an independent voice and 
may take contrary positions to those of  
the UK government.
The differences between the UK and 
Scotland in relation to the EU have 
both material and symbolic importance. 
Fisheries, for example, are of material 
importance. Symbolically, the denial of 
Scotland’s voice within the EU, as it would 
be portrayed after Brexit, would be of 
enormous political importance, though it 
clearly varies in practice, depending on  
the UK ministers involved. 
A vote to leave the EU would certainly 
not make the union stronger or happier. 
It would excite some elements within 
the SNP and would likely cause, then 
have a significant impact on, the 
timing of a second referendum for 
Scottish independence. Yet, there is 
no automaticity. A second Scottish 
referendum is unlikely, unless and 
until public opinion is consistently 
and overwhelmingly in favour of 
independence. 
Wales
Economically, Europe is a very important 
dimension for the Welsh economy.  
Many firms export to the EU and many 
EU companies have offices in Wales. 
There has also been substantial financial 
support for Wales, much of it decided for 
the unfortunate reason that it reflects the 
needs of the Welsh economy, which has 
faced increasing de-industrialisation  
since 1945.
Wales has been engaged for many years 
in the use of EU regional and agricultural 
funds. It has been a major beneficiary 
of structural funds. It is likely that Wales 
is a net recipient of EU funds. Research 
institutions are particularly concerned at 
the prospect of the UK leaving the EU, 
since significant funding for Wales would 
be at risk and there is no guarantee such 
funds would be replaced by new resources 
from the UK government.
There are a number of similarities 
between Wales and Scotland in terms 
of negotiations and the role of Welsh 
ministers in the EU, though in Wales there 
is no push for independence. A key issue, 
however, is the EU money spent in Wales 
and the extent to which it is perceptible. 
Such resources used to be highly visible, 
but they are less so today. Money used to 
be spent on easily visible infrastructure 
projects, while today funds are mostly 
spent on more ‘invisible’ provision, such  
as education and skills training.
Northern Ireland
For Northern Ireland the implications of 
leaving the EU would be substantive, not 
least because of the border between what 
may be a member state and another that 
is leaving the EU. Some politicians in the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
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are concerned about the unpredictable 
scale of the impact if the UK left the EU.  
A narrow result might be unstable.  
It might not provide an outlet for any 
latent political energy. The issue is unlikely 
to be solved by the referendum. Indeed, 
in Northern Ireland the vote might have 
implications for the post-peace process 
settlement.
Local government
Local government’s influence on policy 
development is quite substantial, though 
it is not formal or treaty-based. There are 
many informal lobbying activities between 
local government and the European 
Commission. These bypass national 
government, and very often they are 
effective in developing regional policy  
and the direction of structural funding. 
There are nonetheless legal imperatives for 
local government to be engaged with the 
EU. The implementation of the 70 per cent 
of legislation affecting local government 
and requiring local government 
implementation originates in Brussels, 
but if EU directives affect to a significant 
extent local councils, influencing their 
negotiation is much easier in Brussels than 
in Whitehall. 
Financial benefits received by local 
authorities have been important in terms 
of the direction of local government’s 
plans for economic development.  
In a context of budgetary and policy 
restrictions by central government, many 
local authorities have managed to follow 
an expansionary economic development 
path by using structural funds and other 
EU funding. Leaving the EU could lead  
to a hollowing out of environmental 
protection or social protection, from 
maternal leave to working regulations. 
Having said this, the UK has generally 
adopted the minimum level of such 
regulation as possible.
Local authorities’ offices in the EU 
engender relationships with Commission 
officials allowing informal lobbying and 
the creation of relationships with other 
cities. Scotland is particularly effective 
at creating such links, while the Mayor 
of London has an office in Brussels to 
promote the UK capital’s agenda and 
vision.
Wider observations
The outcome of the referendum may affect 
UK nations’ and regions’ relations with 
each other and with the UK government. 
The UK’s EU membership has allowed 
devolved nations to ‘play off’ UK and 
EU policies. Devolution has created an 
alternative platform to elaborate and 
develop alternative policy to that proposed 
by Whitehall. Nevertheless, devolved 
authorities have proceeded in a relatively 
cautious way, because of uncertainty 
Leaving the EU could lead to a 
hollowing out of environmental 
protection or social protection, 
from maternal leave to working 
regulations.
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about how the changing nature of the 
balance of power within the UK. Devolved 
governments might become more critical 
of, or even antagonistic to, the UK 
government if one or more of the UK’s 
constituent nations voted in a different 
way from the UK as a whole. 
There was consideration of the question of 
the possibility (if the UK remained within 
the EU) of the EU imposing a level playing 
field and a one-size-fits-all solution.  
This is precisely what local government 
might be expected to oppose. Nobody 
disagrees with the view that if central 
government in Whitehall decides what 
local government can and cannot do, this 
is a bad thing. But when such policies are 
decided in Brussels, local influence is quite 
small and perhaps even smaller than at 
Whitehall level. Why would EU rules be 
better than central government rules? 
EU-wide procurement rules arising from 
single market requirements were cited as 
an example.
The EU referendum will take place against 
the backdrop of continuing constitutional 
uncertainty within the UK. The UK has 
been attempting for years to develop new 
constitutionally evolved links between 
both the constituent countries of the 
UK and also within England. It is widely 
accepted that if the UK votes to leave the 
EU there may be pressures within Scotland 
to re-visit the question of independence. 
Wales, because of its reliance of EU funds, 
would face significant financial uncertainty 
if the UK left the EU. In Northern Ireland, 
there are issues related to the peace 
process and, more complicatedly, to the 
border. Local government has developed 
its own relations with the EU, often in an 
attempt to create an alternative power 
source outside Whitehall.
The governments of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland all have reasons to carry 
their own views into the debate about the 
UK’s future in relation to the EU. Inside or 
outside the Union, the devolved nations 
have significant power to change the 
constitutional settlement. England lacks 
a single voice, at least for the present. 
Indeed, the electorate can be segmented 
in many ways, not only by geography. 
Gender, race, ethnicity, age and geography 
are some of the sub-sets of the electorate 
whose views will be differently expressed 
in the referendum. Perhaps the most 
striking conclusion to be drawn from this 
hearing was the diffusion of impacts across 
the UK. No national politician can any 
longer truly speak for the United Kingdom. 
In approaching the referendum, all British 
politicians probably need to bear this 
fact in mind. Decisions about the UK and 
the EU will likely feed back into domestic 
politics for years to come. 
No national politician can  
any longer truly speak for  
the United Kingdom.  
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3.   Scotland, the EU and the referendum
The initial discussion suggested three 
questions needed to be addressed: 
first, how the EU relates to the political 
economy of Scotland. Second, where the 
EU sits in the case made for independence 
made by the SNP, and third, the 
consequences for Scotland of a Brexit vote.
Scotland, it was argued, is an open 
economy on the periphery of the EU with 
a significant industrial legacy. As such, 
the degree of fit with what the EU has on 
offer is immediately apparent. There is 
now a consensus on what can be termed 
an ‘inclusive growth model’. The EU 
has embraced this consensus, accepting 
OECD-type notions, for example that 
there is no trade-off between a vigorous 
drive for growth and social inclusion: 
the one reinforces the other. This has 
broad support in Scotland. There is no 
traction for a vision of a ‘neoliberal’ 
Scotland. In this view of the world, there 
are no conservatives, no Thatcherism. 
The Conservative Party is markedly less 
Eurosceptic in Scotland than south of 
the border. In the longer-term, both 
Conservative and Labour votes have 
fallen in Scotland. At the same time there 
is almost no support for Brexit among 
Scottish businesses, as there is in other 
parts of the UK. 
Scotland’s position within the UK means 
that Scotland is able to have a voice 
within the Commission and the other 
institutions of the EU. It supports the UK 
position where it suits Scotland, but can 
also have an independent voice when 
taking contrary positions to those of the 
UK government. This is not to say that an 
independent Scotland would not have a 
louder voice, but it is important not to 
diminish the value of the leverage Scotland 
already enjoys. This context explains (in 
part) the consistent support in Scottish 
opinion polls for the ‘remain’ position.
Continued membership of the EU is a 
fundamental pillar in the SNP’s case 
for Scottish independence. It lies at the 
core of the SNP view of a viable and 
thriving independent Scottish state, and 
is perfectly parallel with the proposition 
of independence from the UK. This 
independence has always been a call for a 
shared sovereignty model in relation to the 
UK. And Scotland is already used to ‘shared 
sovereignty’. The SNP seeks independence 
within the EU and thus adopts an 
internationalist posture. It really does want 
Scotland’s closest neighbour to remain a 
member of the EU, so Brexit would add a 
series of undesirable complications for the 
independence proposition. 
A Brexit vote would in any case certainly 
not make the union stronger or happier.  
It might excite some elements within  
the SNP and certainly have a significant 
impact on the timing of a potential  
second referendum for independence. 
There is, however, no automaticity, 
however, and a second referendum is 
highly unlikely, unless and until public 
opinion is consistently and overwhelmingly 
in favour of Scottish independence. 
Polarization is the last thing the SNP needs. 
The economic case for independence also 
needs to be reassessed now oil prices are 
no longer at $100 per barrel. While oil 
may no longer contribute much to the 
9LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
overall budget, it remains very present 
in debates about the economic case for 
independence. Its iconographic, symbolic 
significance remains high. But ultimately 
the structure of the Scottish economy 
resembles that of the UK in general, as  
the SNP has endeavoured to point out.
Ultimately, Scottish independence is 
probably too bold a move immediately 
after a Brexit vote, not least because it 
is unlikely that the UK would support 
a second referendum. Such support is 
necessary if only in order to avoid the  
legal challenges of a second referendum. 
We may thus expect a cautious line from 
the SNP. Movements for shared sovereignty 
arrangements rest essentially upon 
consent, and both parties must be willing 
to envisage this. 
There was discussion of the fiscal balance 
arrangements between the EU and 
Scotland. The hearing discussed whether 
Scotland was a net contributor or net 
importer of finance. What was the general 
perception of this issue? Expert evidence 
suggested it was not completely clear 
whether Scotland is a net contributor or 
beneficiary, but the perception was that 
Scotland clearly benefits from Horizon 
2020, structural funds etc. Moreover, the 
EU’s visibility in Scotland is relatively high. 
As far as overall EU funding is concerned 
it was suggested that between 2007 and 
2013 the UK had been a net contributor, 
though two areas within the UK were net 
beneficiaries: Cornwall and West Wales. 
Scotland considers itself a net contributor, 
though, importantly, in social terms a  
net beneficiary. 
Discussions led to the question of whether 
there were examples of how the Scottish 
government aligns itself with the UK 
government, and how it manifests its voice 
independently of the UK government 
within the EU. Expert evidence suggested 
that there was a case of common 
interest between Scotland and UK in 
higher education policy, where Scottish 
universities have benefited significantly 
from, for example, Horizon 2020. Where 
there is a split between Scotland and the 
UK is, for example, in terms of fishing, 
where the industry has large influence 
on the government. To a lesser extent, 
but still importantly, the same can be said 
of agriculture in general. When the SNP 
came to power it worked hard to create 
coalitions of interests and cooperative 
relationships across the spectrum, but 
nowhere as much as in relation to fishing, 
agriculture and rural interests. This plays 
out in EU policy-making, where others 
have real differences with Britain; most 
prominently in relation to priorities with 
regard to ranking, for example, to the 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
If there were a vote to stay, would there 
be calls for a reconfiguration of the 
relations between central and sub-national 
government? And conversely, would there 
be calls for further devolution of power  
in case of a Brexit? And could Scotland 
then take control, for example, of its 
fisheries policy?
The expert response suggested that 
the differences between the UK and 
Scotland are both of material and 
symbolic importance. Fisheries would be 
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of material importance. Symbolically the 
denial of Scotland’s voice within the EU, 
as it would be portrayed, would be of 
enormous symbolically political importance. 
In practice, it varies depending on the UK 
ministers involved. The more confident, 
ebullient ministers are happy to give a voice 
to the Scottish minister of the day. 
Would it change in the event of a vote to 
remain? It is changing anyway, since the 
political weight of Scotland has continued 
to increase since the referendum on 
Scottish independence, and Scotland has 
been taken increasingly seriously within 
the UK. The manifestations of this are 
a more fluid approach to those kinds 
of issues. In case of Brexit, the idea of a 
disaggregation of Scotland’s share of the 
UK budget in relation to the EU would 
actually take about a decade to reorder, 
and development of an agricultural and 
fisheries policy would be crucial, yet 
without any certainty as to the extent of 
money to be made available. Negotiations 
would be likely to prove very difficult.  
Yet, in the end, devolution would probably 
happen. Nonetheless, at the same 
time Scotland would likely try to form 
independent links with the EU.
Opinion polling currently suggested that 
58% of the Scottish public would vote 
to stay and 30% would vote to leave; an 
interesting difference with the English 
polls, where 47% would vote to stay and 
42% would vote to leave. Where there is a 
similarity between Scotland and England is 
on the issue of public services where 30% 
in both countries think the EU has had a 
positive effect on the delivery of public 
services. But in terms of pressure on public 
services 28% of people in England think 
the EU puts pressure on public services 
whereas only 14% think so in Scotland. 
Would Scotland want a voice in the 
post-Brexit negotiation process? It was 
suggested that Scotland would continue  
to argue that it has distinctive interests 
that resonate in the relevant issue areas.  
The expert evidence suggested there might 
be a legislative consensus to force the 
UK government to consult properly with 
the Scottish government. The meeting 
certainly discussed strengthening devolved 
powers, and whether in certain policy 
areas such powers might be weakened. 
Leaving the EU might involve, for example, 
a hollowing out of devolved competences, 
since in some areas, e.g. the environment, 
policy has been operated both at Scottish 
and EU level. Scotland’s approach to 
environmental issues ties in well with the 
EU’s sustainability approach, which has 
often differed from the UK government’s. 
Brexit would cut off the oxygen for this 
policy area in Scotland and Wales, and this 
would likely be strongly perceived as a 
diminishing of devolved competences. 
in terms of pressure on public 
services 28% of people in 
England think the EU puts 
pressure on public services 
whereas only 14% think so  
in Scotland
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If there were pressure (after a ‘leave’ vote) 
in Scotland for a second referendum, 
it would require support from the UK 
government. What would be the likely 
outcome in a scenario where the UK votes 
for Brexit, opinion polls in Scotland show 
support for independence, but the Scottish 
government is overruled within its own 
party and seeks independence. If the 
(possibly new) UK prime minister distances 
the UK government from David Cameron’s 
earlier support for a Scottish referendum, 
what might happen? Scotland could hold 
an unofficial referendum, but could the UK 
then ignore the Scottish people’s vote? 
Expert evidence suggested that after a 
vote to leave the EU, the Scottish polity 
would seek a proposition from the UK in 
order to stop the material conditions in 
the UK turning to Scotland’s disadvantage. 
There would then be demands to know 
how Scotland might pay its way and 
how it might relate to the remaining 
and continuing EU. The questions would 
remain posed, and the deeper the crisis 
after Brexit, the less easily would a proper 
plan reach fruition. 
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4.   Wales, the EU and the Referendum
Wales is a different nation from England in 
many ways, though it has had a very long 
relationship with the EU. Like Scotland, 
the country is peripheral; it lies on the 
edge. Neither the Thatcher nor the Blair 
governments had much impact on Welsh 
political life, and the Welsh government 
is not neutral about EU membership. 
Indeed it is very pro-EU. In the same way 
Wales was pro-Union during the Scottish 
referendum. The referendum was thus 
challenging for Wales because of the 
Welsh Assembly election in May. The EU 
referendum thus muddies the waters in 
what is already a complex election. 
Economically, Europe is a very important 
dimension for the Welsh economy.  
Many firms export to the EU, and many 
EU companies have offices in Wales. 
There has also been substantial financial 
support for Wales, much of it decided for 
the unfortunate reason that it reflects the 
needs of the Welsh economy, which has 
suffered de-industrialisation since 1945. 
In the early years of the 20th century, 
the Welsh economy was contributing 
enormously to the UK economy (largely 
because of its vast coal and steel output). 
It thereby underpinned the UK economy 
in many ways. Yet this was subsequently 
reversed as the country’s economy 
generally became relatively weak 
compared to many other parts of the UK. 
Wales has benefitted from EU regional 
and agricultural funds and has been a 
major beneficiary of structural funds.  
It is likely that Wales is a net recipient of 
EU funds. 
Higher education in Wales, for example, 
receives substantial funding from the 
EU. Research institutions are particularly 
concerned at the prospect of leaving the 
EU, and significant funding for Wales 
would be at risk in the case of Brexit. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee such 
funds would be replaced by new resources 
from the UK government. The impact 
on Wales of leaving the EU would thus 
likely be greater than in other parts of 
the UK, precisely because of the scale of 
receipt of regional funds. The table below 
summarises the position of Wales and 
other UK nations from 2014 to 2020.
EU Structural Funds, 2014-2020
€m
England 6174
Wales 2145
Scotland 795
Northern Ireland 457
Source: Department of Business, 
Innovation & Skills press notice, 
26 March 2013
Welsh government EU interests are often 
in relation to ‘social chapter’ impacts. 
Expert evidence suggested there would 
be a hollowing out in the case of Brexit 
with regard to environmental issues, 
employment rights and equality issues. 
These are all areas driven by EU policy 
and unlikely to have risen to their current 
position in Wales without EU influence. 
13LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
One big difference compared to Scotland 
is that there is no call for independence 
within Wales. Support for independence is 
around 6 or 8% of the population.  
A second difference stems from differences 
between the economic performance of 
Wales and Scotland’s. There is no material 
basis for independence in Wales, simply 
because the resource base is relatively 
weak. The annual fiscal gap hovers around 
£14bn-£15bn. Thus, people in Wales are 
unlikely to want to leave the UK given  
this context. 
There is thus a broadly pro-UK stance 
within ‘official’ Wales, but where does 
this leave the country in terms of the EU 
debate? The answer is: finely balanced. 
Polling at the moment suggests that there 
is a balance between voters intending 
to vote ‘stay’ and those decided to vote 
‘leave’. Ironically, the balance in favour 
of Brexit is probably strongest in areas in 
receipt of the most EU support. 
There are a number of similarities 
between Wales and Scotland in terms 
of negotiations and the role of Welsh 
ministers in the EU. Yet, given the absence 
of a push for independence, Wales 
probably has less influence with the UK 
government. One issue is the EU money 
spent in Wales and the extent to which 
it is perceptible. One expert witness 
suggested EU support used to be highly 
visible, though it is less so now. Resources 
spent on visible infrastructure projects 
could be easily identified, while today 
funds are mostly spent on more ‘invisible’ 
policy areas, such as education and skills 
training. Comparison was also drawn with 
the Highlands of Scotland, which are not 
disadvantaged. The hearing noted that the 
salience of the EU is palpable in economic 
development and farming etc., all highly 
visible as part of what is on offer.  
EU support has proved a binding agent 
linking economy and society.
In Wales voters in poor areas often turn to 
UKIP, whereas in Scotland they vote SNP. 
The leader of the Welsh Conservatives is 
in favour of leaving the EU, though many 
in the Assembly wish to remain in the 
EU. There might be a substantial number 
of Brexit voters within the Conservative 
base, but not so many in an Assembly 
strongly in favour of the EU. Those wishing 
to leave the EU tend to argue that the 
UK will replace the funding that the EU 
currently provides, though this can only be 
a hypothetical argument. It might and it 
might not. 
Considering the differences in how 
different parts of the UK might vote, 
one contributor noted that Scotland is 
clearly in favour of remaining, while 
Wales and the rest of the UK are quite 
evenly split. There might be a tendency 
to make the four nations the units of 
comparison, though there are significant 
differences within England. How does the 
spread of opinion map out in the political 
geography of Wales and Scotland? There 
was consideration of the possible reaction 
in Scotland and Wales if ‘remain’ wins, 
merely because of votes in Scotland and 
London, though if the UK stays in because 
of Scotland and London, it was suggested 
Wales might accept the outcome.
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The question of how the individual parts 
of the UK are likely to vote and whether 
the variation is what might lead the UK to 
remain in the EU was deemed important. 
The Brexit vote is different in different 
parts of the UK and potentially seriously 
problematic in Northern Ireland.  
The Scottish position, it was argued, is 
different from the Welsh position, because 
the Scottish government is stronger in 
many ways. It has been able to act as 
a counter-force to a UK government 
dominated by the Conservatives, and this 
provides a frequently negative narrative 
about the EU. Northern Ireland and Wales 
are thought the least likely to be affected 
by such intra-UK power play.
For Northern Ireland the implications 
are enormous, it was argued, not least 
because of the border between what 
may be a member state and another 
leaving the EU. Some politicians in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland are concerned about the entirely 
unpredictable scale of the impact if the 
UK left the EU. A narrow result might 
cause instability. It might not provide an 
outlet for latent political energy. So the 
issue is unlikely to disappear with the vote. 
Indeed, in Northern Ireland the vote might 
have further implications for the post-
peace process settlement.
In Wales the media has been extensively 
concerned with the EU referendum; the 
Welsh election not even receiving the same 
airtime. Unlike in Scotland, most people in 
Wales get their news from general British 
not Welsh media. The EU referendum 
also played in with the political debate 
leading up to the election. The coincidence 
of the two elections played into UKIP’s 
agenda with UKIP pouring huge resources 
into Wales, where it stood to gain a 
number of seats through the proportional 
representation element of the electoral 
system. So there was something to play for 
in both elections.
As to the impact on the assembly elections 
in Wales, expert evidence suggested 
that interviews with party leaders, and 
particularly with the UKIP leader, focused 
on immigration and European issues, 
both of which are not within Welsh 
government competence. Yet, based on 
the EU referendum debate within Wales, 
UKIP might achieve a stronger position in 
the Welsh election. There is a feedback 
loop between the Assembly election and 
the EU referendum. There is also likely 
to be a period of uncertainty between 
the Assembly election and after the 
referendum. There are thus constraints 
on Welsh government and legal issues to 
sort out. Indeed, subsequent events left a 
deadlock in Cardiff Bay in relation to the 
office of First Minister. 
Might there be an emergency situation 
in Wales because of a withdrawal of 
substantial EU resources from the Welsh 
economy, as expert evidence seemed 
to indicate? The UK government would 
thus have to decide how to replace 
the relatively large Welsh receipt of EU 
funding, as indeed it would to a lesser 
extent in other parts of the UK in receipt 
of substantial EU resources.
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The impact of Brexit on policy coherence 
in the UK was thus considered. Although 
the devolved authorities engage actively in 
capacity-building for policy making, there 
has not been a clash of policies between 
the four countries within the UK. This is 
usually explained by the coincidence of 
Labour governments in the UK, Scotland 
and Wales in the early years after 
devolution. A potential 
culture of deference should also not be 
overlooked. Looking specifically at the 
devolved authorities’ relationship with 
EU policy, account needs to be taken of 
the constitutionally contingent power of 
devolved authority within the UK. 
The UK government may affect sub-
national government access to the EU. 
Because the devolved authorities have 
valued their European position, it has 
allowed them to play off UK and EU 
policies. Devolution has created an 
alternative platform to elaborate and 
develop policy to more restrictive policy 
in Whitehall. Nevertheless, devolved 
authorities have proceeded in a relatively 
cautious fashion, though anxious to  
retain their European platform, which,  
if removed, might imply a changing 
balance of power within the UK.  
Devolved governments might even  
become more antagonistic to the 
UK government. There has been a 
development of an increasingly formal 
network of communication between the 
devolved authorities for information 
sharing. This could be developed as a  
more challenging position in the future  
if the UK left the EU. 
There is likely to be a period  
of uncertainty after the 
Assembly election until  
after the referendum
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Expert evidence suggested that local 
government’s influence on policy 
development is relatively substantial, yet 
not necessarily formal. There are many 
informal lobbying activities between local 
government and the European Commission 
that bypass national government. Very 
often these processes are effective in 
developing regional policy and influential 
in setting the direction of structural 
funding. Sometimes, Scottish interests  
even counter what the UK government  
has actually been seeking to achieve. 
There are also legal imperatives for local 
government to be engaged with the 
EU. The implementation of EU directives 
happens to a large extent through local 
councils. 70% of legislation affecting 
local government originates in Brussels. 
Influencing that kind of legislation is 
much easier in Brussels than in Whitehall. 
Brussels is a much more open bureaucracy. 
Commission officials recognize their 
ignorance of how a policy directive might 
play out if and when implemented, so 
the EU in fact seeks advice from local 
government in formulating directives. 
As to financial benefits received by local 
authorities, these have been important in 
terms of the direction of local government 
economic development. In a context of 
big budgetary and policy restrictions 
by national governments, many local 
governments have managed to follow 
an expansionary economic development 
path by using structural funds and other 
EU funding. Local authorities often find 
a way around problematic relationships 
by looking towards Europe. Leaving the 
EU is likely to lead to a hollowing out 
of environmental protection or social 
protection, from maternal leave to 
working regulations. The UK has adopted 
the minimum level it possibly can.
Local authorities’ offices in the EU were 
traditionally significant in number.  
The UK had 52, but this reduced when 
budget cuts affected councils. They are 
beginning to rebuild and play a useful role. 
These offices may engender relationships 
with Commission officials allowing 
effective informal lobbying and the 
creation of relationships with other cities. 
Scotland is particularly effective at creating 
such links. London has even created two 
Brussels offices; the first set up by local 
government worked democratically, while 
after the 33 local authorities set objectives 
and funding objectives, that office 
closed in 2004. An office very specifically 
promoting the London Mayor’s agenda 
and vision in Brussels continues to exist. 
The City of London also has an office 
in Brussels, focussed on regulation of 
the financial sector and protecting the 
interests of the square mile and the 
financial sector in general. London is 
probably now in a considerably weaker 
position in terms of influence on general 
policy issues and indeed on funding issues 
than it was 5-10 years ago. If the UK leaves 
the EU, there is of course a significant 
funding loss, probably not to be replaced 
by the national government for the sort 
of activities for which local government 
uses EU funding. In many cases, local 
government pursues a different economic 
development agenda from Whitehall. 
5.   Local government, the EU and  
the Referendum
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Local government would also lose access to 
influencing policy development and thus 
the possibility of extending local political 
influence.
Local authorities used to have a closer 
relationship with the EU in relation to 
funding for particular projects. More 
recently, English local authorities 
have been required to bid via central 
government. The local authorities 
may have to re-establish more direct 
relationships whether or not the UK leaves 
the EU. More broadly, cities will continue 
to have strong direct relationships with 
cities within Europe even after Brexit,  
since these relationships are outside the 
formal EU institutions. 
One expert explained that the City of 
London had an unusual approach to the 
EU: a ‘love-hate’ relationship, which began 
in the days of the Major government, 
when links to Europe were few. Realising 
the EU was gearing up to take action in 
relation to the City economy - broadly 
in financial and business services - the 
City became involved directly with EU 
Commissioners, working directly with them 
to deliver on its own objectives. This was 
without the official backing of Whitehall, 
notwithstanding the government’s 
informal support. The increasingly special 
relationship with the EU led to the creation 
of an office, providing direct access 
to the EU’s agenda on the regulation 
of financial markets and assistance in 
drafting directives. As the European 
Parliament achieved greater power, so 
this work became more complicated, and 
the City’s significant amount of lobbying 
and, behind the scenes, close cooperation 
with its opposite numbers in Paris and 
Frankfurt, became more intense. Under 
the post-1997 Labour government, the 
Treasury stepped up its interest in EU 
financial services regulation, with the City 
of London working closely and in parallel 
with them. The City assisted the UK 
government, sharing its contacts within  
EU institutions. 
What impact, therefore, might Brexit have 
on local politics? UKIP has already begun 
to gain a larger share of the ‘protest vote’, 
but would it be undermined if the EU issue 
were finally settled? And how would that 
change politics? 
In relation to migration, a reduction of 
people from Europe could imply some 
local authority services, notably social care, 
experiencing difficulties recruiting workers 
as the result of a reduction in migrant 
workforce. As to EU procurement and 
state aid rules, it is unclear whether there 
would be a relaxation or a need to retain 
single market rules after Brexit. The impact 
on local services and economies is difficult 
to predict. Directives are implemented in 
UK law, so these would need to be re-
considered by government after Brexit. 
However, the future of procurement 
and state aid rules would be tied to 
the question of the future of the single 
market. The UK might have to comply 
with EU rules after leaving the EU in order 
to gain access to markets, thus indicating 
limited independence from the EU in  
this area.
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The Commission heard of the enormous 
variations between different areas and 
groups within the UK. Independently of 
the EU referendum, there is a noticeable 
unravelling of the sense of UK identity, 
likely to continue over the next 20 or 30 
years. There is thus an existential argument 
about ‘who we are? Who do we belong 
to? Who are we against? Who are we 
angry about? Who are we angry with?’ 
40% of all private sector jobs within 
the last 6 years, according to Sheffield 
University, were created in London.  
Yet the capital is only 15% of the 
population. So there is a big issue about 
London. It is a highly concentrated,  
highly emotive subject in terms of jobs, 
winners and losers. This may not be 
geographical. It may not be reflected in 
regional government. It may play out 
differently in the periphery and the centre.  
The main issue is geography of identity 
and emotion; both linked to the places 
where people live, with many other issues 
thereby amplified. The EU referendum 
must be seen against this backdrop.
Polls must be treated with caution. Public 
interest in London in the referendum 
is high. There were more requests for 
referendum voter registration than for 
the London mayoral election. The great 
unravelling of our identity is likely to 
continue, and constitutional issues are 
one part of this. Others will include the 
extent to which we share economically 
and culturally across what is becoming a 
very diverse and varied polity. The Dutch 
referendum showed how an electorate 
might use a vote of this kind to express 
views about other issues. The Dutch 
referendum, ostensibly about a trade 
agreement, was about identity. Finally, 
outside London views are totally different 
from those in the rest of England.
Several participants agreed that the 
identity issue is actually underpinned by 
strong material factors, such as changes in 
the labour market, signifying substantial 
change in the conditions for a significant 
proportion of the population. The more 
important dimension concerns whether 
people are able to control the future 
or are angry about what power holders 
are doing. This is not about party or 
geographical lines, which may have 
implications, but these are not the most 
important factors.
There is not the same passion for place-
based politics in the English debate as 
there is, for example, in Scotland. The 
city-regional deal for Greater Manchester 
was the result of a negotiation between 
the council’s leadership and Whitehall. 
There is no attempt to get local public 
support for that kind of initiative, and 
it is unlikely there will be substantial or 
rapid devolution in England. Significantly, 
though, London is different. 
6. A wider discussion of key issues
If Britain leaves, substantial 
numbers of jobs are expected 
to be lost in ‘City’-type 
occupations, owing to loss of 
access to the single market. 
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If Britain leaves, substantial numbers  
of jobs are expected to be lost in ‘City’-type 
occupations, owing to loss of access  
to the single market. Unemployment 
may rise significantly in London, and if 
London were then to lobby to keep its 
tax resources (to re-invest in its weakened 
economy), that would likely stoke a  
debate on the role of London within the 
UK. If London had (like Scotland) voted 
to stay, while England voted to leave, the 
outcome might be London demands for 
much more extensive devolution than is 
contemplated at present. 
The EU potentially imposing a level playing 
field and a one-size-fits-all solution is 
precisely what local government should 
oppose. Nobody disagreed that if central 
government in Whitehall decides what 
local government can and cannot do,  
this is not welcome. But when it is done  
in Brussels, local influence must be  
quite small. This is a strange argument. 
Why are EU rules better than central 
government rules? Single market demands 
for EU-wide procurement rules were cited 
as an example.
Was sub-national government about  
the ability of local administrations to 
express their political personality?  
This is sometimes better accommodated 
in Brussels. Yet, there are different issues 
here. Procurement is different. Indeed, 
decisions in Brussels are made by national 
governments. Policy decisions may be 
made at the EU level, as can mechanisms 
for delivering the goals formulated at the 
local level. This process is transparent in 
the EU. Against this view, it was suggested 
that the EU might be seen as erecting 
barriers to small businesses and local 
powers, a process that limits freedom and 
leads to a concentration of power away 
from localities.
There followed a discussion of how many 
issues associated with the EU, such as 
migration, international investment and  
so on, are woven into the fabric of the 
most basic functions of the UK economy. 
The structures of production and the 
economy of the nation state are arguably 
being hollowed out by the underlying 
economics of globalization. This, in turn, 
is leading to the unravelling of political 
representation. In that sense the people 
are beginning to be ungovernable. 
Seemingly, when local government 
cannot get what it wants from national 
government it looks elsewhere, and the  
EU has been a very convenient source of 
allies in other cities and the Commission. 
Indeed, this is even more important 
with the impact on local government 
of austerity. Local government now 
seeks money wherever it can be found. 
Brexit implies the UK may need a new 
constitutional settlement between 
national government and local authorities, 
because the need to rearrange post-Brexit 
The structures of production 
and the economy of the nation 
state are being hollowed out  
by the underlying economics  
of globalization.  
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financing of the constituent parts of the 
UK will rise in importance. Local authorities 
may demand a new constitutional 
settlement on finance and possibly far 
more devolution. This is particularly 
important in England, where London will 
be at the forefront. 
It was stressed that the EU budget is a 
redistributive mechanism. Replacing it 
inevitably implies a new redistribution 
mechanism - with winners and losers. 
Wales seems particularly exposed. It may  
be possible that everyone will be a 
winner, because currently the UK is a 
net contributor, but this may not be 
the case if the UK decided to stay in the 
single market, when it would still have to 
contribute resources. It was nonetheless 
accepted that there are many unknowns 
in any such future calculation. The ‘leave’ 
campaign argues nothing will change.  
This was the case in the argument for 
Scottish independence. The tactics of both 
the ‘remain and ‘leave’ campaigns in the 
EU referendum are strikingly similar to 
those used in the Scottish referendum.
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The EU referendum will take place against 
the backdrop of continuing constitutional 
uncertainty within the UK. The UK has 
been attempting for years to develop new 
constitutionally evolved links between 
the constituent countries of the UK, and 
also within England. On 23 June 2016, the 
EU referendum will create new pressures 
on the British system of government. 
Scotland held a referendum on its future 
within the UK as recently as September 
2014. It is widely accepted that if the 
UK votes to leave the EU there may be 
pressures within Scotland to re-visit the 
question of independence. Wales, because 
of its reliance on EU funds, would face 
significant financial uncertainty if the UK 
left the EU. In Northern Ireland, there 
are issues in relation to the peace process 
and, more complicatedly, for the border. 
Local government has developed its own 
relations with the EU, often in an attempt 
to create an alternative power source 
outside Whitehall.
Discussions at the hearing stressed the 
remarkable uncertainty facing the future 
not only of funding, but also of British 
identity. Any change in the relationship 
between the UK and the EU will create 
backwash into the British political system;  
a system already facing multiple threats. 
The traditional political parties face 
internal struggles, while trust in national 
politicians is low. British national identity 
has been challenged in a number of ways. 
Longer-term global economic change 
affects both Europe and the UK. 
The governments of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland have reasons to carry 
their own views into the debate about the 
UK’s future in relation to the EU. Inside or 
outside the Union, the devolved nations 
have significant power to change the 
constitutional settlement. England lacks 
a single voice, at least for the present. 
Indeed, the electorate can be segmented 
in many ways, not only by geography. 
Gender, race, ethnicity, age and geography 
are some of the sub-sets of an electorate, 
whose views will be differently expressed 
in the referendum. Perhaps the most 
striking conclusion from this hearing was 
the diffusion of impacts across the UK.  
No national politician can any longer  
truly speak for the United Kingdom.  
In approaching the referendum, all British 
politicians probably need to bear this fact 
in mind. Decisions about the UK and the 
EU will feed back into domestic politics  
for years to come.
7. Conclusion
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